

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 15305 01 OF 02 240127Z

62/65

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INRE-00

ERDE-00 /026 W

----- 112829

O 231759Z OCT 75

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5996

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 15305

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - E O L I N E

E. O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PARM, US, UR

SUBJECT: TTBT/PNE NEGOTIATIONS: RESTRICTED MEETING OCTOBER
23, 1975 TTBT/PNE DELEGATION MESSAGE NO. 70

REF: MOSCOW 151300

1. SUMMARY. STOESEL STATEMENT IN RESTRICTED MEETING
OCTOBER 23 MADE CLEAR US STILL PREPARED CONSIDER JOINT
DESIGN FOR ON-SITE YIELD MEASUREMENT EQUIPMENT, BUT US VIEW
IS THIS NOT PRACTICALLY POSSIBLE IN TIME REMAINING. THERE
SEEMED TO BE TWO ALTERNATIVES: (A) VERIFYING SIDE TO USE
EQUIPMENT AND PROCEDURES SATISFACTORY TO IT, OR (B) MORAT-
ORIUM ON GROUPS UNTIL MUTUALLY-SATISFACTORY EQUIPMENT AND
PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED. STOESEL ALSO URGED SOVIETS TO
BEGIN DISCUSSION US PROTOCOL II. MOROKHOV SAID USSR NOT
PROPOSING OBLIGATORY JOINT EQUIPMENT, BUT QUESTION NOT
DISCUSSED BY SPECIALISTS AND SHOULD BE BEFORE MAKING
JUDGEMENT. AS TO MORATORIUM, USSR CANNOT AGREE. MOROKHOV
SUGGESTED NEW WORKING GROUP TO ADDRESS PROTOCOL
II AND ANOTHER TO DISCUSS JOINT EQUIPMENT. MAIN MOROKHOV
REMARKS SPELLED OUT FIVE DISAGREEMENTS IN TREATY ((A) FOR-
MULATION OF OBLIGATIONS; (B) COOPERATION/JOINT COMMISSION;
(C) PNE APPLICATION IN THIRD COUNTRIES; (D) DURATION;

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 15305 01 OF 02 240127Z

AND (E) EXCEPTIONS TO AGREED YIELD LIMIT AND TWO MEGATON

GROUP YIELD) AND URGED US REEXAMINATION. STOESEL SAID IN PRELIMINARY COMMENT HE ONLY WISHED REAFFIRM CATEGORIC US POSITION AGAINST EXCEPTIONS. END SUMMARY.

2. JOINT DESIGN FOR ON-SITE YIELD MEASURING EQUIPMENT: STOESEL STATEMENT (REFTEL) AT OCTOBER 23 RESTRICTED MEETING (MOROKHOV/TIMERBAEV/SAFRONOV/KOVALEV-STOESEL/BUCHHEIM/MARTIN/TUNIK) EMPHASIZED US STILL PREPARED TO CONSIDER THIS IDEA, BUT DID NOT VIEW IT AS PRACTICAL POSSIBILITY IN TIME REMAINING PRIOR TO MARCH 31, 1976. US CANNOT AGREE TO BASE AGREEMENT ON ASSUMPTION OF FUTURE SUCCESS OR TO INCLUDE IN AGREEMENT FUTURE DATE CERTAIN FOR SUCH SUCCESS. UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES, UNLESS ONE SIDE WISHES TO ADOPT OTHER'S DESIGN NOW, TWO ALTERNATIVES REMAIN: (A) VERIFYING SIDE TO USE EQUIPMENT/PROCEDURES SATISFACTORY TO IT; OR (B) MORATORIUM ON GROUP EXPLOSIONS PENDING MUTUALLY-SATISFACTORY SOLUTION TO QUESTION. US PREFERS FIRST ALTERNATIVE, BUT LOOKS FORWARD TO USSR VIEWS.

3. MOROKHOV SAID HIS EXPERTS SAY JOINT DESIGN POSSIBLE BUT IT QUESTION SPECIALISTS SHOULD DISCUSS BEFORE REACHING CONCLUSION. UP TO NOW EXPERTS HAVE DISCUSSED SLIFER AND DISCRETE METHODS, BUT NOT GENERAL QUESTION OF JOINT APPROACH TO SHOCK WAVE VELOCITY MEASUREMENT. USSR NOT PROPOSING OBLIGATORY, UNIFIED EQUIPMENT, AND NOT EVEN "ABSOLUTELY SURE" SUCH POSSIBLE. IF COULD BE ACHIEVED WOULD OVERCOME CURRENT DIFFICULTIES, BUT AT LEAST POSSIBLE SHOULD BE DISCUSSED. USSR COULD ALSO PROPOSE ALTERNATIVES, SUCH AS, USSR WOULD USE SLIFER IN US, AND US WOULD USE DISCRETE EQUIPMENT IN USSR. MORATORIUM, HOWEVER, NOT AGREEABLE TO USSR. IDEA HAD BEEN RAISED IN PAST AND USSR POSITION REMAINS AGAINST. MOROKHOV PROPOSED SPECIALIST DISCUSSION, WITH BEZUMOV, ASSISTED BY VOLKOV, TO REPRESENT USSR. THIS AGREED, WITH NORDYKE FOR US.

4. US PROTOCOL II: STOESEL SAID HE HAD INSTRUCTED USDEL TO CONSIDER ALL TEXTUAL MATERIALS PUT FORWARD BY EITHER SIDE AND DEVELOP, TO DEGREE POSSIBLE, A REFERENDUM JOINT DRAFT LANGUAGE. HE SORRY THERE SEEMED TO BE MISUNDERSTANDING ON THIS AND URGED SOVIET SIDE TO BEGIN DISCUSS US

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 15305 01 OF 02 240127Z

PROTOCOL II SO THAT PROGRESS COULD CONTINUE. MOROKHOV SAID HE HAD GIVEN SAME INSTRUCTIONS TO SAFRONOV, BUT HAD ALSO TOLD HIM TO FOCUS ON PROTOCOL I. AS FOR PROTOCOL II, AGREEMENT ON QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE AS TO YIELD VERIFICATION AT SITE WOULD PERMIT FURTHER PROGRESS. HE PROPOSED A WORKING GROUP III HEADED BY BEZUMOV TO PURSUE THIS QUESTION IN PARALLEL WITH WORKING GROUP II. THIS AGREED, WITH MCALLISTER FOR US.

5. TREATY DISAGREEMENTS A LA MOROKHOV: MOROKHOV RAISED FIVE DISAGREEMENTS IN TREATY TEXT AND URGED US REEXAMINATION IN ORDER TO FACILITATE PROGRESS. FIVE POINTS ARE: (A) FORMULATION OF PRINCIPAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS; (B) COOPERATION/JOINT COMMISSION; (C) PNE APPLICATION IN THIRD COUNTRIES; (D) DURATION; AND (E) EXCEPTIONS TO AGREED YIELD LIMIT AND TWO-MEGATON THRESHOLD FOR GROUP.

6. FORMULATION OF OBLIGATIONS: TWO APPROACHES ARE BASICALLY DIFFERENT, SAID MOROKHOV. US TAKES LIMITATIVE PROHIBITIVE APPROACH, WHILE USSR BELIEVES THERE IS RIGHT TO CARRY OUT PNEs. PNEs, ALTHOUGH CONNECTED WITH TTBT, SHOULD NOT BE ASSESSED AS IN ANY WAY RESEMBLING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. USSR UNDERSTANDS THAT PNEs SHOULD NOT INVOLVE WEAPON-RELATED BENEFITS, INCLUDING ANY DATA THAT MIGHT LEAD TO WEAPONS IMPROVEMENT, AS RESULT OF WHICH USSR PREPARED TO ACCEPT CERTAIN LIMITATIVE PROVISIONS IN TREATY. TWO PARTIES, HOWEVER, SHOULD BE ACCORDED THE RIGHT TO CARRY OUT PNEs "WITHIN THE BOUNDRIES CREATED BY THE TREATY." IN SPIRIT OF COMPROMISE USSR PREPARED TO INCLUDE PROVISION TO BAN EVERYTHING NOT EXPRESSLY PERMITTED BY TREATY.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 15305 02 OF 02 232308Z

65

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INRE-00

ERDE-00 /026 W

----- 110721

O 231759Z OCT 75

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5997

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MOSCOW 15305

EXDIS

7. COOPERATION/PNE JOINT COMMISSION: MOROKHOV UNDERSCORED AGAIN USSR ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THIS

BECAUSE GREAT DEAL OF VERIFICATION, INCLUDING OBSERVER RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS, COULD BE IMPLEMENTED ONLY ON BASIS OF COOPERATION. COMMISSION WOULD REGULATE RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO PARTIES IN PNE FIELD WITHIN LIMITS OF PNE AGREEMENT, AND SHOULD BE PERMANENT BODY. IT WOULD ENABLE SIDES TO MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT WITH RESPECT TO TREATY IMPLEMENTATION. IT NECESSARY CREATE COMMISSION ALSO BECAUSE PNES SO COMPLEX AND DYNAMIC.

8. PNE APPLICATION IN THIRD COUNTRIES: US ARTICLE VI VIEWED BY USSR AS "IN STRIKING CONTRADICTION" WITH NPT ARTICLE V, AS WELL AS WITH SOVIET PRINCIPLES OF FOREIGN POLICY--WHICH REJECT ANY IMPOSITION OF ANY CONDITIONS ON THIRD COUNTRIES. SOVIET SIDE HAS FORMULATION "WHICH EMBRACES ALL NECESSARY PROVISIONS AND IDEAS" ON THIRD-COUNTRY QUESTION, WITHOUT, AT THE SAME TIME, CREATING TWO DIFFICULTIES MOROKHOV HAD JUST NOTED.

9. DURATION: IN SOVIET VIEW IT NOT LOGICAL TO CONNECT PNE DURATION WITH TTBT. THIS REINFORCED BY BASIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN WEAPON TEST EXPLOSIONS AND PNES. UNLIMITED DURATION ESSENTIAL BECAUSE AS LESS TIME AND EFFORT DEVOTED TO WEAPONS MORE TIME AND EFFORT SHOULD BE DEVOTED TO PEACEFUL APPLICATION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, INCLUDING PNES.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 15305 02 OF 02 232308Z

IF US APPROACH FOLLOWED, COULD LEAD TO SITUATION UNDER A CTB PRECLUDING PNES. SOVIETS UNDERSTAND NEED FOR WITHDRAWAL POSSIBILITY AND, IN SPIRIT OF COMPROMISE, PREPARED INCLUDE SUCH PROVISION.

10. EXCEPTIONS TO AGREED YIELD LIMIT AND TWO-MEGATON THRESHOLD FOR GROUPS: MOROKHOV SAID SIMPLY HIS LAST POINT BY NO MEANS HIS LEAST IMPORTANT, AND STATED SOVIET SIDE FIRM THAT EXCEPTIONS SHOULD BE PROVIDED FOR, AND TWO-MEGATON PROPER THRESHOLD FOR GROUPS.

11. I #CUSSION MOROKHOV #

TIMERBAE;

INDICATED TO STOESSEL UNDERSTANDING OF NEED TO DEVELOP AD REFERENDUM JOINT DRAFT LANGUAGE COVERING ALL ESSENTIAL TEXTUAL MATERIAL WITH FEWEST POSSIBLE BRACKETS. LATTER, THEY SAID, LOOKED TO INCLUDE (A) EXCEPTIONS, (B) PERHAPS DURATION, AND (C) SPECIFICATION OF WHOSE EQUIPMENT TO BE USED FOR ON-SITE YIELD VERIFICATION. LANGUAGE PROVISIONS ON LATTER POINT COULD BE DEVELOPED SO LONG AS WHOSE EQUIPMENT NOT SPECIFIED. MOROKHOV ADDITIONALLY MADE CLEAR HE UNDERSTOOD THAT ALL ESSENTIAL PROVISIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE INCLUDED, ONE WAY OR ANOTHER, IN INITIAL TEXTS, WITH ANY PNE JOINT COMMISSION ONLY ADDRESSING FUTURE QUESTIONS. HE ALSO

MADE CLEAR THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT ALL TEXTS WOULD HAVE TO BE SIGNED AT THE SAME TIME, BUT SUGGESTED THAT THOSE CONTAINING DETAILS MIGHT BE SIGNED AT LOWER LEVEL THAN TREATY AND PROTOCOL.

12. IN BRIEF CONVERSATION AFTER RESTRICTED MEETING, BUCHHEIM ASKED SAFRONOV WHAT HE THOUGHT MIGHT BE INVOLVED IN REACHING A JOINT DESIGN FOR NEW VERIFICATION INSTRUMENTS. IN ADDITION TO COMMENTS ABOUT IMPORTANCE OF BOTH SIDES HAVING CONFIDENCE IN THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF "THE INSIDES" OF SUCH INSTRUMENTS, SAFRONOV EXPRESSED VIEW THAT WHOLE PROCESS OF DESIGN, TESTING, ETC., TO POINT OF REALIZATION OF A SATISFACTORY PRODUCT COULD BE A LONG TIME, MAYBE YEARS.

13. FOLLOWING MEETINGS AGREED FOR OCTOBER 24: WORKING GROUP I AT 10:30 AM; WORKING GROUP II AND III AT 3:00 PM;
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 15305 02 OF 02 232308Z

AND JOINT DESIGN DISCUSSION AT 3:30 PM.

14. SUPPLEMENT TO MOSCOW 15150 ON OCTOBER 22 RESTRICTED MEETING. SPEAKING OF BLANKS IN SOVIET DRAFT PROTOCOL CONCERNING TIME PERIOD OF ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF EVENT, MOROKHOV SAID: (A) ORIGINAL US DRAFT SAID 90 DAYS; (B) NOW US EXPERTS HAVE DOUBTS ABOUT THIS TIME SPECIFICATION (COMMENT: THIS IS NOT CORRECT, HE WAS REFERRING TO FACT US SIDE AGREED TO OMIT TIME FIGURE WHILE DEVELOPING FORMULATION OF NOTICE PROVISION. END COMMENT.); (C) SOVIET SIDE NOT YET PREPARED TO STATE A NUMBER FOR NOTICE PERIOD BECAUSE ITS WORK CONCERNING CORRECT NUMBER IS NOT YET COMPLETED; (D) CORRECT NOTICE PERIOD MAINLY DETERMINED BY NEEDS OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS; AND (E) TIME NEEDED IS VERY MUCH THE SAME FOR BOTH SIDES. COMMENT: POINT (E) WAS COINED IN AMBIGUOUS TERMS WHICH COULD ALSO BE INTERPRETED AS MEANING IT WILL TAKE EACH SIDE ABOUT SAME AMOUNT OF TIME TO FIGURE OUT WHAT CORRECT NOTICE PERIOD IS, ALTHOUGH THIS IS NOT REASONABLE IN VIEW OF US SIDE HAVING SET FORTH SPECIFIC NOTICE PERIOD. END COMMENT.
STOESSEL

NOTE BY OC/T: # OMISSION CORRECTION FOLLOWS.

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: ARMS CONTROL MEETINGS, PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, NUCLEAR TEST SITES, NEGOTIATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 23 OCT 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: KelleyW0
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975MOSCOW15305
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X3
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750369-0521
From: MOSCOW
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19751024/aaaaavnk.tel
Line Count: 269
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: 75 MOSCOW 151300
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: KelleyW0
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 28 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <28 APR 2003 by GarlanWA>; APPROVED <03 NOV 2003 by KelleyW0>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: TTBT/PNE NEGOTIATIONS: RESTRICTED MEETING OCTOBER 23, 1975 TTBT/PNE DELEGATION MESSAGE NO. 70
TAGS: PARM, US, UR
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006